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Are Nurses More Altruistic than Real Estate Brokers?
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We report results from a dictator game experiment with nurse students and real estate broker 
students as dictators, and Amnesty International as the recipient. Although brokers 
contributed substantial amounts, nurses contributed significantly more, on average 76 
percent of their endowment. In a second part, subjects chose between a certain repetition of 
the experiment and a 50-50 chance of costly exit. About one third of the brokers and half of 
the nurses chose the exit option. While generosity was indeed higher among nurses, even 
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1  Introduction 
There seems to be a myth that people holding certain occupations, such as nurses, are generally more 
caring, generous or altruistic than others. As wonderfully represented by the Hollywood character 
Gordon Gekko in his famous statement greed is good,
1 certain other occupations – such as financial 
market traders – seem, on the other hand, to be associated with egoism. In the present paper, we 
explore this myth by comparing the generosity of two student groups – nurse students and real estate 
broker students (henceforth, nurses and brokers) in an economic experiment. The main questions we 
address are the following: Are nurses more generous than brokers? If so, can this be attributed to a 
higher degree of altruism, the way this concept has been defined in the economics literature? 
We approach these issues by means of a double-blind dictator game experiment in which a charity, 
Amnesty International, is the recipient. In Part 1 of our experiment, every subject was asked to share 
100 Norwegian kroner (NOK), or about 16.5 USD,
2 between themselves and Amnesty International. 
Our results show that brokers contribute, on average, a substantial 61 percent of their endowment; 
nurses‘ contributions were significantly larger, however, reaching an average of 75 percent. Thus, in 
this particular context, nurses were indeed more generous than brokers.  
Part 2 of our experiment is inspired by the work of Dana, Cain and Dawes (2006); Dana, Weber and 
Kuang (2007); Lazear et al. (2006), and Broberg et al. (2007). These authors show that when subjects 
are given the option to exit a dictator game, or when the consequence for others of the dictator‘s 
choice is obscured, generosity is substantially reduced. In the second part of our experiment, therefore, 
subjects were given the choice between two options, A and B. Option A implied repeating the game 
from Part 1 with certainty. Option B implied a 50 percent probability of repeating the game from Part 
1,  and  a  50  percent probability  of  receiving  90  NOK  with no  opportunity  to  donate to  Amnesty 
International. Thus, option B implied a 50 percent probability of costly exit from the dictator game 
situation.  
Nurses were substantially more likely to opt for the exit alternative than brokers: 36 percent of brokers 
and 51 percent of nurses chose B. Interestingly, however, those subjects who opted for exit but drew a 
repetition of the dictator game contributed substantial amounts: 31 percent for brokers and 42 percent 
for nurses. Even after accounting for exit behavior, nurses were more generous than brokers (in Part 2 
and in total).  
As we discuss in more detail below, this pattern of behavior is hard to reconcile with most standard 
models of social preferences. One possible explanation, however, could be that nurses experience a 
stronger sense of duty to conform with moral ideals (Brekke et al. 2003, Cappelen et al. 2007, Konow 
2010, Nyborg 2011), and that this sense of duty applies more strongly to sharing decisions than to exit 
decisions.  
2  Occupational differences in generosity: theory and evidence  
Previous  theoretical  research  within  economics  provides  several  reasons  why  one  might  expect 
occupational differences in generosity.  
First, there is a recent strand of literature arguing that more cooperative individuals may self-select 
into certain jobs or professions, nursing being one much used example (Heyes 2005; Besley and 
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Ghatak 2005; Prendergast 2007; Delfgaauw and Dur 2008; Brekke and Nyborg 2008, 2010; Brekke et 
al.  2009).  The  argument  is,  in  brief,  that  a  combination  of  relatively  low  pay  and  intrinsically 
rewarding work is attractive only to those who are intrinsically motivated. Brekke and Nyborg (2010) 
distinguish between two production sectors, one in which workers are paid according to their marginal 
productivity and another, ‗nursing‘, where efforts are not verifiable and wages are thus fixed. Brekke 
and Nyborg show that a preference to be important to others simply reinforces market incentives in the 
first sector, not changing effort choices at all, while a similar preference can have profound effects on 
effort in the nursing sector. They show, moreover, that if nurses‘ wages are kept sufficiently low, 
workers  with  strong  preferences  for  being  important  to  others  will  self-select  into  nursing,  thus 
ensuring that nurses provide high effort levels even in the absence of monetary incentives to do so. 
Since  the  essential  difference  between  the  two  sectors  in  their  model  is  the  different  incentive 
structures, not the nature of the work, this provides one rationale for picking real estate agent students 
as the group being compared to nurses in our study: While fixed, relatively low wages seems to be the 
standard  for  nurses,  real  estate  agents  typically  receive  a  substantial  share  of  their  pay  through 
performance measures.  
Occupational differences in generosity could, alternatively, be caused by socialization into occupation-
specific  norms  and  identities  (Freidson  2001)  rather  than  self-selection  by  highly  motivated 
individuals. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) assume that there exists a plurality of social categories, as 
well as a prescription of appropriate or ideal behaviors for each group. Deviating from the prescription 
induces a utility loss via weakening the person‘s feeling of identity or ‗sense of self‘. If, for some 
reason,  the  social  category  nurse  is  associated  with  different  prescriptions  than  broker,  identity 
concerns could cause students identifying with each of these categories to behave differently even in a 
completely anonymous laboratory experiment.
3 
Although dictator game experiments have often been used to study generosity, dictator behavior  can 
hardly yet be said to be  well understood. Dictator giving is, for example, highly sensitive to the 
construction of choice sets (Dana et al. 2006; List 2007; Bardsley 2008, Asheim et al. 2010), whether 
endowments are earned (Cherry et al. 2002) and the degree of dictator anonymity (Hoffman et al. 
2008). Such findings are hard to reconcile with standard economic models of preferences defined only 
over final outcomes. Thus, it is of interest to explore whether a higher generosity among nurses could 
be explained in the perhaps most straightforward way; that nurses, for whatever reason, simply have 
stronger preferences for others‘ welfare, or for giving per se, than brokers. This is the motivation for 
Part 2 of our experiment.  
While a number of experiments have explored variations in ultimatum -and dictator game behavior 
over academic majors, results are mixed. Some studies find economic students to be less generous 
(Carter and Irons 1991; Cappelen, Nygaard, Sørensen and Tungodden 2010); others find the opposite 
(Kahneman et al. 1986; Frey and Bohnet 1995); while still others find no effects (Eckel and Grossman 
1996; Kagel et al. 1996). No simple and robust gender differences seem to exist in dictator behavior 
(Bolton et al. 1998; Eckel and Grossman 1996, Croson and Gneezy 2009).  
                                                           
3 Note that our experimental design cannot distinguish between the self-selection and socialization theories; 
both provide reasons, however, that looking for occupational differences in generosity may be worthwhile. 
Cappelen, Nygaard, Sørensen and Tungodden (2010) found substantial differences in generosity between the 
student  population  at  the  Norwegian  School  of  Economics  and  Business  Administration  and  the  general 
population (with business /economics students being less generous), while Cappelen, Sørensen and Tungodden 
(2010)  compared  the  behavior  of  first-  and  last-year  students  at  the  same  school  and  did  not  observe 
substantial differences; these findings would speak for at least some self-selection effect. 4 
 
To our knowledge, no previous experiments have explored the dictator behavior of nurses. However, 
Cadsby and Maynes (1998) compared the behavior of business and economics students to nurses in a 
provision point public good game, and found nurses to be more cooperative: While cooperation among 
the business and economics students quickly collapsed, nurses started out with higher contributions, 
were willing to continue contributing even after rounds where the threshold was not reached, and 
generally tended to move around the cooperative equilibrium.
  
3  Exit and motives for generosity 
Our interest lies not only with the level of generosity, but also its possible underlying causes. As 
indicated above, several aspects of dictator behavior seem inconsistent with standard economic models 
of selfishness or altruism where preferences are defined over material outcomes. For example, Dana et 
al. (2007) compared a binary choice baseline, in which a large majority of dictators preferred the ―fair‖ 
allocation (5, 5) to the ―unfair‖ alternative (6, 1), with alternative treatments enabling dictators to 
obscure  the  relationship  between  their  actions  and  the  resulting  outcomes.  In  these  alternative 
treatments, generosity was significantly lower than in the baseline case.
4 This and similar experiments 
may indicate that subjects are motivated by a sense  of moral obligation; that this sense is not 
independent of situational context; and that some subjects prefer to avoid contexts associated with a 
moral responsibility.
5  
Individuals may have a preference for keeping moral obligations and yet feel ambivalent towards this 
sense of obligation. Moral prescriptions and self-interest (narrowly defined) often conflict. In cases of 
unresolved internal conflicts, cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger 1957; see Aronson et al. 2005)  
predicts that the perceived trade-off between self-interest and moral obligation may be highly sensitive 
to apparently irrelevant modifications of experimental design.  
As demonstrated by Bicchieri (2006), however, there is no universal consensus that giving in dicta tor 
games is morally superior to not giving. In a survey asking respondents to consider a standard dictator 
game, as many as 56 percent did not consider  any allocation ‗excessively greedy or unfair‘. In the 
current  experiment,  our  choice  of  a  charity  as  the  recipient  aims  specifically  at  increasing  the 
probability  that  subjects  consider  giving  a  morally  superior  choice.  Previous  studies  indicate  that 
giving increases if the recipient is a charity (Eckel and Grossman 1996).
6 To account for variations in 
subjects‘ attitudes to this particular charity, we used a post-experimental survey. 
As Dana et al. (2006), Lazear et al. (2006), and Broberg et al. (2007) we introduce a costly exit (in Part 
2 of the experiment). These studies all demonstrate that some dictators prefer to exit the dictator game 
even if exit reduces monetary pay-off. In Dana et al. (2006), subjects first made the sharing decision 
(as in a standard $10 dictator game) and were subsequently given an option to exit (ex post exit 
option). About a third of participants chose exit, that is, accepted $9 to keep, while the recipient would 
receive nothing and would not be told that a dictator game was to be played. Broberg et al. (2007) 
replicated the Dana et al. (2006) study, but instead of simply offering a fixed exit cost, they estimated 
participants‘ exit reservation prices. Almost two-thirds of their dictators had exit reservation values 
inconsistent with preferences defined over outcomes only.
 The study most similar to ours is that of 
Lazear et al. (2006). Here, dictators were first asked to divide $10 between themselves and another 
participant, and the majority chose to share at least some of their endowment. In a second round, the 
                                                           
4 See also Larson and Capra (2009).  
5 For discussions, see Nyborg (2011), Eika (2011). 
6 In Eckel and Grossman’s study, Red Cross was the recipient. In our case we preferred to use a different charity 
since nurses may feel more strongly associated with the Red Cross than brokers.   5 
 
same subjects were given the choice between repeating the game and "pass", where the latter meant 
receiving $10 without the opportunity to share. Most subjects — including many who had given the 
recipient a substantial share in the first round, thus apparently having preferences for sharing — chose 
to pass, avoiding the sharing option altogether. In subsequent rounds, the researchers introduced a 
strictly positive cost of opting out; still, a substantial share of subjects chose to pass. 
For an individual who cares  only about her own material consumption, choosing costly exit in a 
dictator game is strictly dominated by playing the dictator game and keeping everything. For a pure 
altruist (Andreoni  1988),  costly  exit is  strictly  dominated  too:  For  someone who  cares  about  her 
material payoff as well as the aggregate payoff to Amnesty International, playing the dictator game 
offers a larger set of feasible allocations other than exiting, including some that are strictly preferred to 
the  payoffs  implied  by  exit.  Nor  can  Andreoni‘s  (1990)  impure  altruism  model,  in  which  the 
individual  has  preferences  for  her  own  consumption,  aggregate  public  good  supply  and  her  own 
contribution level, solve the puzzle: A dictator game offers the subject the option of higher payoff to 
herself, higher payoff to Amnesty International, and more own giving than costly exit.  
As long as there are no restrictions on allowed dictator allocations, similar reasoning holds for inequity 
aversion models (Bolton and Ockenfels 2000; Fehr and Schmidt 1999). The non-strategic nature of the 
game precludes explanations based on reciprocity (Rabin 1993); and since our experiment is double-
blind, theories of social esteem, social approval etc. are of little relevance.     
Dana et al. (2006) interpret the observed exit behavior in their experiments as reflecting a desire not to 
violate  the  recipient‘s  expectations  (Charness  and  Duwfenberg  2006,  Battigalli  and  Dufwenberg 
2007). If a dictator chose the exit option in Dana et al.‘s experiment, her recipient would never get to 
know  about  the  dictator  game,  thus  there  would  be  no  expectations  to  violate.  In  an  alternative 
treatment, however, Dana et al. (2006) did not tell recipients receiving money why they did so. In this 
latter  case,  hardly  any  dictators  chose  to  exit.  Dana  et  al.  (2006)  conclude,  thus,  that  giving  is 
motivated by a desire not to disappoint recipients‘ expectations. In our experiment, however, this 
explanation would seem considerably less plausible: Amnesty International is not a person, and neither 
individual members of the organization, its employees, nor its beneficiaries would have any reason to 
expect donations from our experiment. In a recent experiment  by Ellingsen et al. (2010) a novel 
procedure  is  used  to  induce  the  dictator‘s  second  order  beliefs;  the  dictator‘s  beliefs  about  the 
recipient‘s beliefs about how much the dictator is going to give. These induced second order beliefs do 
not correlate with actual giving in the experiment, casting doubt on the explanatory power of guilt 
aversion even in experiments with human recipients present in the lab.   
If a subject experiences a salient moral dilemma between contributing to Amnesty International and 
keeping money for herself, she can resolve the dilemma either by giving up a lot of money or by 
giving up her good conscience. She cannot have both. Exit removes, perhaps, the salience of the 
dilemma, possibly enabling her to have, in fact, both.  
4  The Experiment 
The experiments were carried out in April and September 2010. Seven rounds of experiments were 
conducted  at  three  different  schools;  BI  Norwegian  School  of  Management,  Akershus  University 
College and Oslo University College. We recruited students from two bachelor programs in nursing 
(Akershus University College and Oslo University College) and from the bachelor program in real 
estate brokerage (BI Norwegian School of Management).  6 
 
In total 194 subjects participated in the study; 62 men and 132 women. The full composition of 
subjects by gender, field of study, and experiment type is given in Table 1. We thus have a substantial 
overrepresentation  of  females,  which  is  not  surprising  given  that  females  are  typically  vastly 
overrepresented among nurse students. Note, however, that we only have micro level data on gender 
for 169 of our subjects (59 men and 102 women).
 7 
[Table 1 about here] 
All subjects participated in one experiment consisting of two parts.
8 We ran two treatments: The 
Uncertain exit treatment, a dictator game with uncertain exit option as explained above (five sessions), 
and the Certain exit treatment (two sessions). The only difference between the Uncertain and Certain 
exit treatments is that in the latter, choosing alternative B in Part 2 implied certain costly exit, i.e. a 
100 percent probability of receiving 90 NOK and no opportunity to donate to Amnesty International.  
The  uncertainty  in  the  first  of  these  treatments  was  introduced  partly  in  order  to  obscure  the 
consequences  for  the  recipient  of  exiting,  since  previous  evidence  indicates  that  this  decreases 
subjects‘ generosity (Dana, Weber and Kuang 2007; Lazear et al. 2006). In addition, however, it 
provides a chance to observe behavior of subjects who prefer to exit, but who are nevertheless placed 
in a dictator situation. In the Uncertain exit treatment, however, one possible explanation for exit could 
simply be a desire for excitement; if this was the sole explanation exit behavior would disappear 
altogether in the absence of a random element in the exit option. We thus included the Certain exit 
treatment to check whether we would still get exits in this case.  
Subjects were seated in a large room. Each subject drew a random number making it possible to link 
decisions in the two parts. One subject was drawn to serve as a monitor. The monitor overlooked the 
counting  of  donations,  received  250  NOK  for  the  job,  but  did  not  otherwise  participate  in  the 
experiment. Procedures were double-blind and based on the use of coins, envelopes, paper and pens 
(no computers). The allocation of coins between the subject and Amnesty International was done 
while the subject was hidden behind a large box. For details, see the instructions in Appendix B.    
At the end of the session, subjects were asked to answer a simple questionnaire. A bank receipt 
confirming the total amount of money donated to Amnesty International, as well as a confirmation 
from the monitor, was published on one of the experimenters‘ homepage.  
5  Experimental findings 
5.1  Do nurses contribute more? 
In Part 1, average contributions were 74,6 NOK for nurse students and 61,0 NOK for broker students. 
The  difference  of  13.64 NOK  is  statistically  significant  both  using  a t-test  (p=.0088)  and  a  non-
parametric Mann-Whitney test (p=.014).  
The full distribution of contributions by field of study is shown in the upper row of Figure 1, where the 
upper  panel  shows  the  cumulative  distribution  function  and  the  lower  panel  a  histogram.  The 
                                                           
7 Because of anonymity concerns, we did not ask for subjects’ gender if one gender was represented by less 
than four subjects in a session. This happened in one session with 33 nurse students, where only three men 
were present. However, we do know that for each subject in this session there is a probability (33-3)/33=0.91 
for the subject being female. 
8 In the instructions, the two parts were called “Experiment 1” and “Experiment 2”. 7 
 
contributions of nurses stochastically dominate those of brokers (i.e. for any contribution level, there 
are more brokers than nurses contributing less than this), so this is not only a difference in means. 
More than 12% of brokers contributed 0, while all nurses contributed strictly positive amounts. Almost 
half of the nursing students contributed everything, i.e. 100 NOK, whereas only 13% contributed less 
than 50. Hence we can conclude that contribution levels are higher among nursing students than 
among real estate students. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
[Figure 1: Distribution of contributions by profession. Notes: Nurses shown with light red bars and 
dashed lines, brokers with dark blue bars and solid lines. All data used. For Part 2, only data on non-
exiting subjects used. Total contribution is defined as the sum of contributions in Parts 1 and 2, where 
those who exited  in Part 2 are assumed to contribute 0.] 
Contributions in Part 2 for those who did not exit the experiment are shown in the middle row of 
Figure 1. In this part, nurses contributed on average 61.06 NOK, while brokers contributed 42.41 
NOK. The difference of 18.65 NOK is statistically significant both with the t-test (p=.0069) and the 
Mann-Whitney test (p=0037). 
Finally, we can compare the sum of contributions in both parts of the experiment. We define those 
exiting in Part 2 as contributing zero. Then, nurses contribute on average 122.33 NOK, while brokers 
contribute 94.19 NOK. The difference of 28.14 NOK is also significant both using a t-test (p=.0052) 
and  the  Mann-Whitney  test  (p=.0050).  The  distribution  of  total  contributions  shown  in  Figure  2 
reveals, again, that the contributions by nurses stochastically dominate those of brokers. 
Thus, in this particular setting there seems to be some truth to the myth:; nurses are more generous 
than brokers.  
5.2  Exit behavior 
Let  us  now  consider  the  decision  to  exit  the  experiment,  focusing  mainly  on  the  Uncertain  exit 
treatment. Among the real estate students, 36 percent (16 out of 44) chose the exit option B, whereas 
51 percent (46 out of 91) of the nursing students chose B. The difference is only weakly different from 
zero using a t-test for proportions (p=.12), so although nurses are more likely to exit, the tendency is 
not very certain. 
In line with the results of Dana et al. (2006), Lazear et al (2006) and Broberg (2007) a substantial 
share of our subjects opted for a costly exit option. While Dana et al. (2006) explain exit behavior by a 
desire  not  to  violate  the  recipient‘s  expectation,  this  can  hardly  explain  our  results.  .  Next, 
contributions in Part 1 may say something about subject types relevant for subsequent exit choice 
Those who later choose alternative A in Part 2, i.e. a repetition of the dictator game, contributed on 
average 74.58 NOK in Part 1, and those who later choose exit (alternative B), contributed 71.94 in 
Part 1. This difference is not significant at any meaningful level of significance.  
This  raw  comparison,  however,  hides  a  pattern  that  can  be  seen  in  Figure  2,  where  we  show 
cumulative distribution functions for contributions in Part 1 broken down by field of study and exit 
choice. It is seen that among real estate students, contributions appear to be higher among those who 
choose B in Part 2 – the lottery with possible exit – whereas the opposite pattern appears among the 
nursing  students.  Indeed, Part 1  contributions  are  NOK  11.70  higher  among  exiting  brokers  than 
repeating  brokers  (NOK  70.62  versus  58.93  NOK)  but  NOK  12.15  lower  among  exiting  nurses 8 
 
compared  to  repeating  nurses  (72.39  NOK  versus  84.55  NOK).  While  this  difference  is  not 
significantly different from zero among the brokers (p=.34), it clearly is among the nurses (p=.038).  
[Figure 2 about here] 
[Figure 2: Distribution of contribution in Part 1 by profession and subsequent choice.] 
  
Broberg et al (2007) and Dana et al. (2006) found  a (weak) positive correlation between contributions 
in the game and the tendency to exit. We find the same tendency among brokers, but the opposite 
holds for nurses.   
These findings are confirmed in the more formal logit analyses reported in Table 2, where we regress 
the choice of exit on field of study and/or Part 1 contribution. Neither of the variables are significant 
without the interaction (Columns (1) and (2)), but when we condition the effect of contribution in 
Period 1 on nurses and brokers in Column (3), it becomes clear that high contributions increases the 
likelihood of choosing exit for brokers while reducing it for nurses. This is also confirmed by splitting 
the sample between brokers and nurses in Columns (4) and (5). 
[Table 2 about here] 
5.3  Contributions after choice of exit 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, generosity may be motivated by a sense of moral obligation. One possible 
hypothesis  is  that  sense  of  obligation  depends  on  the  situational  context.  In  part  two  of    our 
experiment, subjects are faced with two types of choices; how (or whether) to share, and whether to 
exit  the  dictator  game.  Both  have  implications  for  payoff  outcomes,  but  the  moral  responsibility 
associated with the two types of choices may differ. Our data seems consistent with this interpretation.  
Another interpretation would be that those who chose the exit option B did so because they wanted to 
keep 90 NOK and did not, for some reason, realize that this was an option in alternative A as well. 
However, this does not seem to be supported by the data: Only 2 out of 28 subjects who chose B, but 
drew a repeated dictator game, chose the ―exit like‖ strategy of keeping NOK 90 for themselves and 
contributing NOK 10 to the recipient.  
How do contributions in the second part of the experiment differ between those who wanted to repeat 
Part 1 and those who chose B in Part 2, but still drew a repetition in the lottery? The distributions of 
contributions for the two groups are shown in Figure 3. Contribution levels were much higher in the 
former  group  than  the  latter,  65.88  NOK  versus  38.29.  This  difference  (27.59  NOK)  is  clearly 
significantly different from zero (p=.0005). Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that even those who opted 
for exit did contribute substantial amounts if they did in fact draw a repeated dictator game.  
[Figure 3 about here] 
[Figure 3: Distribution of contribution in Part 2 by choice of alternative. Notes: Subjects who chose to 
repeat the game depicted with solid lines and dark green bars,those who chose possible exit (and drew 
a repetition) in dashed lines and light orange bars. Only data from the treatment with uncertain exit 
employed.] 
 
In Figure 4, the difference in contribution between those who chose, respectively, A and B in Part 2 is 
decomposed by profession. Again we see that nurses contribute more than brokers, but the difference 
between  those  choosing  A  and  B  is  about  the  same,  close  to  12  NOK,  among  students  of  both 
professions.  9 
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
[Figure 4: Distribution of contributions in Part 2 by choice of alternative and profession. Notes: Only 
data from the uncertain exit treatment used.] 
 
5.4  Certain exit 
Finally, it is interesting to see whether some subjects choose the exit option B even when this is not 
uncertain. Since alternative B was in practice a lottery, while alternative A was not, exit behavior may 
be motivated by a desire for excitement. If this was the only reason, however, we would hardly see 
exit when removing the lottery aspect.  
In the Uncertain exit treatment, 46% of subjects (62 out of 135) chose alternative B in Part 2 (the 
lottery). In the Certain exit treatment, where alternative B in Part 2 implied getting for sure 90 NOK 
and no donation choice, only 28% (17 out of 60) chose alternative B. This difference is statistically 
significant (p=0.021). The difference is mostly driven buy the nursing students where the difference is 
21  percentage  points  (p=.05),  whereas  the  difference  is  only  10%  (p=.38)  among  the  real  estate 
students.  
Thus, while exit is preferred by fewer in the Certain exit treatment, a substantial share still choose 
alternative B. Exit behavior hence cannot be explained only on the basis of a desire for excitement. 
Note that one cannot readily conclude that the difference in exit behavior between the two treatments 
is indeed caused by a desire for excitement: In accordance with previous experiments, we would also 
expect that more subjects choose B in the Uncertain exit treatments due to the fact that the uncertainty 
obscures the consequences for others of one‘s choice.  
5.5  Profession or gender? 
We saw in Table 1 that there are clear gender biases in the choice of field of study. Indeed, 84 percent 
of the nurse students and only 38 percent of the broker students were female. Hence, the effects of 
profession seen above could be driven by gender differences in behavior.  
[Table 3 about here] 
Table 4 reports results from regressing contributions on profession and gender. In Column (1) it seems 
as if gender is more important than profession; the nurse dummy is still positive but not significant. 
This is hiding an interesting pattern revealed by the specification in Column (2), though. Here we also 
include the interaction between profession and gender. It turns out that nurses contribute more than 
brokers, and women more than men, but the effects do not accumulate. In fact, female and male nurses 
contribute, respectively, 76.99 and 71.43 NOK, i.e. about the same level of magnitude, while female 
and  male  brokers contribute  75.71  and  51.56  NOK,  a  major  difference.  Hence,  it  seems  that  the 
difference is mostly between male brokers and the other subjects. Columns (3) and (4) that reports 
results on contributions in Part 2 of the experiment show fairly similar patterns. From this we conclude 
that gender certainly plays a major role in shaping contribution levels, but profession is also important. 
5.6  Attitudes toward the charity 
A final worry may be that nurses and brokers, and men and women, have different attitudes toward the 
particular charity serving as our recipient, Amnesty International. This could in principle be the single 
driving force behind the findings described above. To check this, we included  three questions on 
subjects‘ attitudes to Amnesty in the post-experimental questionnaire. Specifically, we asked subjects 10 
 
to rank from 1 to 5 their knowledge of the organization, their trust in the organization, and their 
judgment of the importance of the work of the organization. The answers to the three questions were 
heavily correlated, and a factor analysis revealed a single dominant factor. To simplify the analysis, 
we therefore decided to focus on the average response to the three questions.
9 
Estimations including these measures of attitudes are reported in Appendix A. First, Table A-1 shows 
that nurses and women tend to have higher esteem for Amnesty International than do men and brokers. 
The relationship is not very strong, though. In Table A-2 we include the attitude index in some of the 
baseline estimations shown above. We clearly see that subjects  who report a higher esteem for the 
organization tend to have higher contributions both in Part 1 and 2 of the experiment.   In any case, as 
the attitude index is not very heavily correlated with  profession and gender, the results discussed 
above are qualitatively unchanged. Note, however, that if subjects feel a need to rationalize their own 
choices, reported attitudes to the charity may not be completely exogenous to contribution and/or exit 
behavior. 
6  Discussion 
As  discussed  above,  exit  behaviour  is  hard  to  explain  using  standard  economic  models.  Several 
statements  made  in  the  post-experimental  questionnaire,  however,  indicate  that  one  motive  for 
choosing exit is that it provides an option of monetary payoff to oneself without bad conscience. This 
would be in line with models assuming that people strive towards ideals of moral behaviour (Konow 
2010, Nyborg 2011), but only if, for some reason, subjects feel more morally obligated to share when 
in the dictator game than to avoid the dictator game.  
Consider, for example, the following responses to the question ―why did you make the choices you 
did‖ from subjects in the Uncertain exit treatment who all chose B in Part 2, but drew a repeated 
dictator game:  
I like surprises, and got the chance to ‘win’ money without bad conscience. (Broker; 
contributed 10 in Part 1 and 10 in Part 2).  
Envelope B gave me an opportunity to win without getting a bad conscience. (Broker, 
contributed 70 in Part 1 and 50 in Part 2).  
If I had received 90 NOK without any choice whether to donate it, I could have kept it 
with a good conscience, while when I had the option, I would give most of it to Amnesty. 
(Nurse, 80 NOK in Part 1, 80NOK in Part 2.) 
Excitement. A wish to keep more money than I had the conscience to if I had chosen A. 
(Nurse, 70 NOK in Part 1, 40 NOK in Part 2.) 
Such statements may seem puzzling; these subjects appear to act upon a feeling of responsibility when 
placed in the dictator position, while they do not appear to experience the same sense of responsibility 
for not exiting – although the exit decision certainly has implications for sharing too. Our results, like 
the results of other researchers cited above, thus seem to indicate that many individuals are willing to 
share when placed in ‗sharing context‘, while at the same time preferring to avoid that context.   
 
                                                           
9 This average is almost exactly proportional to the first principal component and yields results that are easier 
to interpret than what comes out of factor analyses and principal component analyses. 11 
 
For someone choosing the exit option, escaping from the moral dilemma must be worth at least 10 
NOK. Note, however, that escaping the dilemma gives different observable consequences depending 
on how the subject would otherwise have resolved it, and on how large contributions she would 
otherwise  need  to  make  to  avoid  her  own  conscience  –  which  may  differ  substantially  between 
persons. Even if two persons with identical contributions in Part 1 both exit to get money with a clear 
conscience, the implication for the first might primarily be a better conscience, while for the second it 
may be more money. Similarly, there is not necessarily any clear relationship between the amount 
donated in Part 1 and the degree to which the subject experiences a bad conscience for not having 
given enough; that depends, of course, on what she thinks she should have done.   
As reported above, it turns out that among nurses, those who exit are less generous than others; among 
brokers, the opposite holds. Still, however, in Part 1 exiting nurses contribute, on average, more than 
exiting brokers.  
 
Nurses thus seem to be troubled more by their conscience than brokers for the same contribution level. 
One  interpretation  is  that  nurses  are  more  duty-oriented  than  brokers,  in  the  sense  that  they  1) 
experience  stronger  feelings  of  duty  in  the  sharing  context;  2)  that  this  typically  leads  them  to 
contribute high amounts when in the role of a dictator, and 3) if they do not, the associated bad 
conscience is strong. This would imply i) high contributions in part 1, ii) high exit in part 2, iii) high 
contributions from exiters who receive a second dictator game.   
7  Conclusions 
Using a dictator game with a costly exit option and with Amnesty International as the recipient, we 
find that nurse students are more generous when placed in the role as dictators than real estate broker 
students. However, this finding cannot simply be explained by nurse students being more altruistic in 
the sense that they care more about Amnesty International, or in the sense that they care more about 
their own giving. If that was the explanation, we should not observe high exit rates among the nurse 
students. While about one third of the brokers chose the exit option, more than half of the nurse 
students did. However, when choosing an uncertain exit option but drawing another dictator game, not 
the exit, nurse students contributed substantial amounts, leaving them with much less money than what 
their payoff would have been with the costly exit. This is consistent with the idea that at least part of 
the observed generosity is caused by a sense of duty which is context-specific in the following sense: 
The obligation to contribute when placed in a sharing context, is stronger than the obligation to place 
oneself in a sharing context. That nurses are more generous in the role as dictators, but also more 
prone to opt for exit, might thus be explained by nurses experiencing a stronger sense of duty than 
brokers, and that this sense of duty does not apply equally strongly to the exit choice as to the sharing 
choice.     
If nurses are genuinely more altruistic towards others, the pleasure of helping would be a reward in 
itself, presumably stimulating generosity in predictable and stable ways. If nurses‘ high generosity is, 
instead, motivated by context-dependent moral obligation, this might be different. Depending on the 
specific relationships between context and responsibility, obligations might be avoided, for example, 
by choosing another occupation; by turning ones back to the needy; by reconsidering one‘s belief 
about  the  strictness  of  identity  requirements  for  one‘s  profession;  or  by  otherwise  redefining  the 
situation as a less demanding one. Generosity caused by context-dependent moral obligation may thus 
possibly be more easily undermined, and more sensitive to seemingly unimportant contextual changes, 
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Appendix A: Additional estimation results 
 
[Tables A-1 and A-2 about here] 
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Appendix B: Instructions 
[Note:  The instructions  below  are  translated  from Norwegian.  Instructions  are  identical for  both 
treatments except when mentioned explicitly.] 
Welcome to the experiment. This is an economic experiment, in which you can earn money. This 
money is provided by a research institution. The results from the experiment will be used in a research 
project. It is therefore important that you follow certain rules. Mobile phones must be switched off and 
you are not allowed to talk during the experiment. Please raise your hand if you have questions. One 
of those responsible for the experiment will then come to you. 
We will conduct two experiments, both with the opportunity to earn money. What you choose in 
Experiment 1 will not in any way affect your choices or your possible earnings in Experiment 2. All 
decisions will be anonymous. Neither the other participants nor those responsible for the experiment 
will be able to know which choices you make. 
One of the participants has been drawn to serve as an observer. This person will witness the counting 
of money after the experiment, and confirm that this has been done correctly. The observer is paid 
NOK 250, and will need to stay for about 15 minutes longer than the other participants. The observer 
will not himself/herself participate in the experiment. 
(Requests that the person who has drawn participant no. 1 raises a hand. This person will be the 
observer.) 
Experiment 1 
In a moment, you will receive a closed bubble envelope. When it is your turn, bring your envelope to 
the designated station. Stand behind the box so that you hide your choice.  
Then open the envelope and take out the contents. The envelope contains two smaller envelopes, one 
unmarked and one marked "To Amnesty", ten ten-kroner (a total of NOK 100) and instructions. The 
instructions have the following text:  
1.  Write down your participant number on the inside of the bubble envelope. 
2.  Your task is to distribute the money between yourself and Amnesty International. The full amount of 
what you place in the envelope marked "To Amnesty" will be sent to Amnesty International. The 
amount  you  place  in  the  small  unmarked  envelope  is  yours  to  keep.  You  are  completely  free  to 
determine the distribution, but the entire sum of money should be distributed so that the amount in the 
two envelopes together totals NOK 100. 
3.  Seal both of the two small envelopes. The unmarked envelope is yours to keep, bring this home when 
the experiment is finished. Place the envelope marked "To Amnesty" back into the bubble envelope.  
4.  Put the unmarked bubble envelope in the box that is located between stations, marked "Submission". 
5.  Then return to your seat and wait for further instructions. 
In order for you to know that the money is actually transferred to Amnesty International, we will post 
a receipt for payment on Karine Nyborg`s home page, http://folk.uio.no/karineny/. We will also post 
the observer`s confirmation.  




 (Envelopes are handed out and the experiment can start) 
Experiment 2 [Certain exit treatment only] 
In a moment you will be handed two bubble envelopes, one marked A: I choose to repeat Experiment 
1 and one marked B: I choose a payment of NOK 90 without any additional choices. 
When it is your turn to go to one of the stations, bring both envelopes to the assigned station. You 
must then choose between envelope A and envelope B. Stand behind the box so that you hide your 
selection. Then open the envelope and follow the instructions. NOTE: YOU MUST OPEN ONLY 
ONE ENVELOPE! 
It will still not be possible for others in the room to know your choices.  
Envelope A has exactly the same content as the envelope you received in the previous experiment. If 
you choose this envelope, you will be asked to distribute NOK 100 between yourself and Amnesty 
International, and you are still completely free to choose the distribution. 
Envelope B provides no further choices. This contains only one small envelope and NOK 90 which 
you can keep. 
If you choose envelope A, the instructions will have the following text: 
1.  Write down your participant number on the inside of the bubble envelope. 
2.  Your task is to distribute the money between yourself and Amnesty International. The full amount of 
what you place in the envelope marked "To Amnesty" will be sent to Amnesty International. The 
amount  you  place  in  the  small  unmarked  envelope  is  yours  to  keep.  You  are  completely  free  to 
determine the distribution, but the entire sum of money should be distributed so that the amount in the 
two envelopes together totals NOK 100. 
3.  Seal the small envelopes. The unmarked envelope is yours to keep, you should take it with you when 
the experiment is finished. Place the envelope marked "To Amnesty" back into the bubble envelope. 
4.  Remember to remove both tags from the bubble envelopes. 
5.  Hand in both bubble envelopes. Put the opened envelope in the box marked "Submission", and the 
unopened envelope in the box "Unused envelopes”. Both of these boxes will be located between the 
stations. The small unmarked envelope is for you to take home. 
 
If you choose envelope B, the instructions will have the following text: 
1.  Write down your participant number on the inside of the bubble envelope. 
2.  Place all the money (NOK 90) in the small unmarked envelope, which you will keep yourself. 
3.  Remember to remove the tag on both bubble envelopes. 
4.  Hand in both bubble envelopes. Put the opened envelope in the box marked "Submission", and the 
unopened envelope in the box "Unused envelopes”. Both of these boxes will be located between the 
stations. The small unmarked envelope is for you to take home. 
Once you have handed in both bubble envelopes you will be handed a simple questionnaire. This must 
be filled out, folded and left in the box by the exit. After the questionnaire is handed in, you are free to 
leave. 
Thank you for your participation! 
(Envelopes are handed out, then the experiment may begin) 18 
 
Experiment 2 [uncertain exit treatment only] 
In a moment you will draw two bubble envelopes, one marked A: I choose to repeat Experiment 1 and 
one marked B: I choose the envelope with unknown content.  
When it is your turn to go to one of the stations, bring both envelopes to the assigned station. You 
must then choose between envelope A and envelope B. Stand behind the box so that you hide your 
selection. Then open the envelope and follow the instructions. NOTE: YOU MUST OPEN ONLY 
ONE ENVELOPE! 
It will still not be possible for others in the room to know your choices.  
Envelope A has exactly same content as the envelope you received in the previous experiment. If you 
choose  this  envelope,  you  will  be  asked  to  distribute  100  kr  between  yourself  and  Amnesty 
International, and you are still completely free to choose the distribution. 
Half of the envelopes marked B contain exactly the same as envelope  A. Therefore, if you have 
received one of these, and choose B, you will also in this case be asked to distribute NOK 100between 
yourself and Amnesty International. 
The other half of the envelopes marked B, however, provide no further choices. These contain only 
one small envelope and NOK 90 which you can keep. 
Hence, if you choose envelope B, you do not know what it contains, but both alternatives are equally 
probable. 
If you choose envelope A, or you choose envelope B and it contains the same as envelope A, the 
instructions will have the following text: 
1.  Write down your participant number on the inside of the bubble envelope. 
2.  Your task is to distribute the money between yourself and Amnesty International. The full amount of 
what you place in the envelope marked "To Amnesty" will be sent to Amnesty International. The amount 
you place in the small unmarked envelope is yours to keep. You are completely free to determine the 
distribution, but the entire sum of money should be distributed so that the amount in the two envelopes 
together totals NOK 100. 
3.  Seal  the  small  envelopes.  The  unmarked  envelope  is  yours  to  keep,  bring  it  with  you  when  the 
experiment is finished. Place the envelope marked "To Amnesty" back in the bubble envelope. 
4.  Remember to remove both tags from the bubble envelopes. 
5.  Hand in both bubble envelopes. Put the opened envelope in the box marked "Submission", and the 
unopened envelope in the box "Unused envelopes”. Both of these boxes will be located between the 
stations. The small unmarked envelope is for you to take home. 
If  you  choose  envelope  B  and  you  are  not  given  further  choices,  the  instructions  will  have  the 
following text: 
1.  Write down your participant number on the inside of the bubble envelope. 
2.  Place all the money (NOK 90) in the small unmarked envelope, which you will keep yourself. 
3.  Remember to remove the tag on both bubble envelopes. 
4.  Hand in both bubble envelopes. Put the opened envelope in the box marked "Submission", and the 
unopened envelope in the box "Unused envelopes”. Both of these boxes will be located between the 
stations. The small unmarked envelope is for you to take home. 
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Once you have handed in both bubble envelopes you will be handed a simple questionnaire. This must 
be filled out, folded and left in the box by the exit. After the questionnaire is handed in, you are free to 
leave. 
Thank for your participation! 
You will now draw envelopes. Please wait to open the selected envelope until it is your turn at one of 
the stations. 
 (The participants draw envelopes, then the experiment may begin) 
 Table 1: Subjects by gender, profession, and treatment type
Men Women
Certain exit Uncertain exit Total Certain exit Uncertain exit Total
Broker 21 24 45 9 19 28
Nurse 7 10 (7) 17 (14) 23 81 (51) 104 (74)
Total 28 34 (31) 62 (59) 32 100 (70) 132 (102)
Notes: Gender data were not collected from one session due to anonymity concerns. Subject
composition without these are given in parentheses.
Table 2: Exit choice in Part 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Nurse 0.582 2.415***
(1.54) (2.58)
Contribution in Part 1 -0.00245 0.00781 0.00781 -0.0165**
(-0.47) (0.94) (0.94) (-2.03)
Nurse  Contribution -0.0243**
(-2.09)
N 135 134 134 44 90
Sample All All All Broker Nurse
Notes: Coecients are from a logit analysis with choice of (uncertain) exit in Part 2 as the
dependent variable.
*, **, and *** denote signicance at the 10, 5, and 1 % level.
1Table 3: Occupation versus gender
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Nurse 6.049 18.97* 35.95* 39.37**
(1.10) (1.97) (1.94) (2.28)
Female 16.24*** 24.16*** 22.70* 28.09**
(2.75) (3.17) (1.68) (2.22)




Constant 54.59*** 51.56*** 31.05*** 39.19***
(12.53) (10.91) (3.39) (4.48)
Part 1 1 2 2
N 193 193 107 107
R2 0.0780 0.0907 0.0881 0.219
Notes: Coecients are from OLS regressions. Dependent variable is contribution in Part 1
(Columns (1) and (2)) and in Part 2 (Columns (3) and (4)).
Columns (3) and (4) are based on subjects facing a possibility of uncertain exit and either
choosing or drawing repeated game.The subjects in the session where gender was not collected
for anonymity reasons, the female dummy is assigned the fraction of women present (0.91).
*, **, and *** denote signicance at the 10, 5, and 1 % level.
Table A-1: Determinants of attitudes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Nurse 0.258** 0.143 0.0864 0.191 0.136
(2.37) (1.14) (0.51) (1.13) (0.97)
Female 0.320*** 0.242* 0.311* 0.0887 0.315**
(2.76) (1.80) (1.70) (0.49) (2.10)
Constant 3.616*** 3.559*** 3.524*** 3.319*** 3.158*** 4.098***
(42.33) (37.71) (35.45) (24.47) (23.54) (37.04)
Dependent var Index Index Index Condence Knowledge Objective
N 192 192 192 192 193 192
R2 0.0288 0.0386 0.0452 0.0278 0.0146 0.0505
Notes: Coecients are from OLS regressions. Dependent variables are measures of attitudes
toward Amnesty International. *, **, and *** denote signicance at the 10, 5, and 1 %
level.
2Table A-2: Contributions and attitudes
(1) (2) (3)
Nurse 4.454 19.28** 36.84**
(0.83) (2.05) (2.14)
Female 13.66** 22.68*** 27.02**
(2.35) (3.05) (2.15)




Attitude index 10.19*** 10.59*** 8.766
(3.27) (3.42) (1.63)
Constant 18.72 13.81 7.806
(1.59) (1.15) (0.37)
Part 1 1 2
Treatment Both Both Uncertain exit
N 192 192 107
R2 0.126 0.143 0.239
Notes: Coecients are from OLS regressions. Dependent variable is contribution. *, **,
and *** denote signicance at the 10, 5, and 1 % level.
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Both parts
Notes: Nurses shown with light red bars and dashed lines, brokers with dark blue bars and
solid lines.
All data used. For Part 2, only data on non-exiting subjects used. Total contribution is
dened as the sum of contributions in parts 1 and 2, where those who exited in part 2 are
assumed to contribute 0.
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Notes: Subjects who chose to repeat the game depicted with solid lines and dark green bars,
those who chose possible exit (and drew a repetition) in dashed lines and light orange bars.
Only data from the treatment with uncertain exit employed.
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Notes: Only data from the uncertain exit treatment used.
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